Despiteall the measurest aken against al-Qaedaa nd like-minded organizationsafterSeptember11,2001,Jihadist terrorismhasremained a dangerous threat.Although itwould beexaggerated tostatethatJihadist organizationshavebecome stronger,al-Qaeda'sbiggest success mayhave been thatitavoided totald isintegration. Tosurvivei nani ncreasingly hostile environment,itchanged its structuresand strategies.Asa consequenceo fthe failuretorootout al-Qaedaa fter2 001,J ihadist terrorismislikelytoposeathreatforyears tocome.
Itisdifficultt oj udge the extentt owhichal-Qaedaa nd affiliated organizationsand networksr emain aforcetobereckoned withbecause the Jihadist phenomenon hasdeveloped. The coreo rganization around Osamabin Laden and hisdeputy Aimanal-Zawahirimayhaveweakened, but affiliated groupsand cellsin the Arab world and Pakistanhavegained in importanceand havecontinued theirHolyWaragainst the West and regimesin theirhome countries.
Since2001,three trendshavecharacterized the developmentof Jihadist terrorism:the returno fArab volunteers from Afghanistantotheirhome countries,the emergenceofneworganizationsonlylooselyaffiliated with al-Qaeda, and al-Qaeda'schange from organization toideology.
•I n2001al-QaedawasmainlyanArab organization. When itlost its headquarters in Afghanistan,manyof its fighters returned totheircountriesof origin in the Arab world. Asac onsequence,J ihadist terrorism returned tothe Middle East,wherethe terrorist threathadlost some of the importancei thadh adi nthe mid-1990s.Forinstance,a l-Qaedaon the ArabianPeninsulastarted anunprecedented terrorist campaign in Saudi Arabiain May2003,whichlasted well into2005. Today,Jihadists areagain aforcetobereckoned withall overt he Middle East.North politique étrangère l specialissue:2008 politique étrangère l specialissue:2008 Africa ist hreatened in particular,a st he newal-Qaedain the Islamic Maghrebiss pearheading atrend towardsmilitantactivity in Algeria and its neighboring countries.
•N ewJihadist organizationshavee merged and aligned themselves with" al-Qaedac entral" in the Pakistani mountains.The Iraqwarhas proven tobethe most importantbreeding ground fort heseo rganizations.In2004,the JordanianAbuMusab al-Zarqawifounded al-Qaeda in Mesopotamiaa nd used the rareo pportunity tof ightt he American troopsand theiralliesin one of the corecountriesof the Arab world. Until 2007,al-Qaedain Iraqwaseven morepowerfulthanthe al-Qaeda leadership around bin Laden. Byr enaming itself,a l-Qaedain Iraq aimed ataccessing al-Qaeda'srecruiting and financing networksin the Gulf region. Itw asclearlynots ubordinatetoal-Qaedac entral,b ut spreadthe impression thatal-Qaedawasindeed atransnationalorganization withglobalreach. However,al-Qaedain Iraqwasseverelyweakened afterthe American"surge" in 2007.
•T he al-Qaedaleadership escaped tothe Pakistani side of the AfghanPakistani borderin late2001. From October2001,bin Laden and Zawahirii ncreasinglyr elied on video and audio messagest ospreadtheir ideology,but alsostrategicand tacticaladvicetotheirfollowers worldwide. Thereby,theymanaged toretain some of theirformerinfluence. Inf act,in severalcasesattacksw erep erpetrated in countriesafter Osamabin Laden haddemanded action there. Tothe extent,however, thatt he al-Qaedaleadership wasno longerable too rchestrateattacks from its headquarters,J ihadist terrorismbecame morei ndependent from largerorganizations,especiallyin Europe. 
Seven years afterthe 2001 attacks,Jihadist terrorism isamorewidespread phenomenon InternationalCooperation
Despiteall the measuresadopted afterSeptember11,2001,multilateral cooperation in counterterrorismdid nothavemuchinfluenceonthe actual situation. The Bushadministration followed ane ssentiallyu nilateral strategyand invited its partners tojoin in "coalitionsof the willing." Itwas quitesuccessfuli nthisr egardwhen -shortlyafterSeptember11th-i t looked foralliestohelp ittotopple the TalibaninAfghanistanand laterto rebuild the country.Manycountriesfollowed,including GreatBritain, France,G ermany,C anada, Spain,I taly,a nd manyothers.However, doubts soon spreadast owhetherAmericanstrategiess uited the phenomenon. Especiallyt he Americanp redilection forconventional military solutionscreated resistanceamong Europeanp opulationsand governments.
Theseconflicts erupted when the Americang overnmentdecided to invade Iraq. While some Europeang overnments,suchasGreatBritain, Spain,Italy,and Poland,decided tosupport the United States,Franceand Germanyrejected the invasion,reflecting awidespreadEuropeanunease withAmericanpoliciesafter9/11. The warhadserious consequencesfor transatlanticrelations,sincei tled toaprolonged estrangementbetween the Bushadministration on the one side and ChancellorSchröderand PresidentChirac on the other.Furthermore,the EuropeanUnion wassplit on thisissue,weakening its cohesion forthe coming years.Thishindered the Europeansfrom moreeffectivelyinfluencing and therebymoderating US policies.Inf act,internationali nitiativesw erem oreo ften thann otillfated efforts of Americanalliestoconvincethe Bushadministration thatits policiesonlyaggravated the problem theyweredesigned tofight.Rather thanwinning trust in the home countriesof the Jihadists,the US lost the last remnants of credibility and support itmighthaveh adamong Arabs and Muslimsafter2001.
Rathert hanwinning the hearts and mindsof potentialal-Qaeda supporters,U Spoliciess eemed perfectlydesigned top rovethatOsama bin Laden'sclaim,thatthe world haddeclared waron Islam,wascorrect. InEuropeancounterterrorismcircles,itisrathercommon sensethatastate thathasbecome the targetof aterrorist organization should notoverreact. Bydefinition,terrorists areweakand perpetrateattacksin ordert o mobilizesympathizers fort heirgoals.Astatethatoverreacts and cracks downn otonlyon the terrorists themselvesbut alsoo ntheirpotential supporters risksalienating and pushing them intothe armsof the terrorists.Onthe otherhand,astatethatr eacts in ac ircumspectw ay mightisolatethe terrorists from theirs ympathizers and therebyhinder theirr adicalization,recruitment,a nd mobilization. Some terrorist organizations,among them manyJihadist ones,even try toprovoke their adversariestooverreactin ordertoconvincetheirsympathizers thatonly violenceoffers the chancetoreachtheirgoals.
The United Statesgovernment(over-)reacted just ast he Jihadists wished. The treatmentof prisoners in Guantanamo and AbuGhraibwere onlyt woo fthe most blatantexamplesof counterproductivem easures. "Extraordinary renditions"toMiddle Easterncountrieslike Jordan, Egypt,a nd Syria, wheretortured uring interrogation iscommon,is anotherexample. The United States'blatant disregardf orhumanrights played intothe handsof al-Qaeda.Todaymorethani n2001, Muslimsall overthe world believethatthe US and the West arefighting Islamorthe Muslim world ratherthanjust terrorism. The invasion of Iraqin2003 finallyconvinced manyyoung Arabst hatt he Muslim world ist he target.Manyof thoseyoung Arab men who havetraveled toIraqi no rdert oj oin the insurgencyare motivated byt he desiretod efend the Muslim world against this aggression (Steinberg,2008 
The Roots of al-Qaedain the Arab World
Even att he time of the 9/11 attacks,a l-Qaedawasnott he global organization manyanalysts claimed thatitw as.Rather,a l-Qaeda'sgoals havealways been ambivalent.Onthe one hand,ithasfollowed aglobal agenda.Thiswasaconcretegoalinsofarasthe organization aimed tocause the US towithdrawfrom the Arab and Muslim worlds,especiallyEgypt and Saudi Arabia.Thisagendabecomesdiffuse,however,withregardto its goalsbeyond thiswithdrawal. Al-Qaedaand its affiliated organizations haveneverclearlystated whereand when theirjihadwould end. Onthe otherhand,a l-Qaedahasalways constituted the sumo fi ts member groups'nationalaims.The Egyptianswanttotopple the Mubarakregime in theirhome country.Bin Laden and hisSaudi followers demand the overthrowof the Saudi ruling familyin Saudi Arabia.Asac onsequence, al-Qaedaaimsatmultiple revolutionsin its Arab home countriesin order totopple the authoritarianregimest here. Its globalj ihadsupports this originalg oalo fm ost Jihadists onlyt osome extent.Onlyfrom the mid1990s,when itbecame cleart hatJihadist militants would notbeable to reachtheirgoalsin theirhome countries,did al-Qaedaa doptanantiAmericanstrategy.Byforcing awithdrawalofthe United Statesfrom the Arab world,a l-Qaedahoped toweaken the regimest hatdepended on Americansupport.
WORLD POLICY CONFERENCE 2008
The most importantexample forthistrend in Jihadist terrorismhasbeen the history of the EgyptianJihadg roupl ed byAimanal-Zawahiri,today numbertwointhe al-Qaedahierarchy.The Egyptianmilitants hadtargeted the regime in Cairofrom the 1970s and hadassassinated PresidentAnwar al-Sadatin October1981. However,theirplott otopple the regime failed and triggered awaveo farrests in the coming years.From the mid-1980s, manyEgyptiansfled the repression in theirhome country and joined the Arabsfighting alongside the Afghani nsurgents in Pakistan. Farfrom adopting ani nternationalist agenda, the Egyptiansr egarded theirs tay ratherasaprelude toanothereffort tofightthe "nearenemy,"namelythe Mubarakregime. Infact,in 1992,the Egyptiangroupsstarted aninsurgency in Egyptitself. In1995,however,itbecame clearthatthe Egyptianstatehad gained the upperhand and thatthe Islamists hadfailed. Aimanal-Zawahiri drewthe consequencesand devised anewstrategy:insteadoffighting the "nearenemy,"the Jihadists should redirecttheirefforts towardsthe United States,Russia, and Israel. From nowon,the Jihadists should fight"the near and the farenemy"inanintegrated worldwide campaign. 3 Subsequently,Zawahiriand hisfollowers laid the organizationalbasis forthe implementation of theirstrategy.In1996-1997,theyentered intoan alliancewithOsamab in Laden and hisfollowers in Afghanistan. This eventmarked the foundation of al-Qaedaasaglobalterrorist organization. Nevertheless,al-Qaedachosetoattackthe US first and foremost becauseit wasthe most importantforeign supporterof boththe Saudi and Egyptian governments.And although al-Qaedaincreasinglyw idened the scope of its activitiesand developed aglobalagenda, itremained committed tothe goalo fo verthrowing the autocraticgovernments in its militants' respectiveh ome countries.Asaresult,itw asable toattracty oung men from all overthe Arab world,from MoroccotoIraq. Infact,its ideological and strategicflexibility allows itt orecruitbothm oren ationalist-minded and moregloballyoriented fighters.
The localand regionald imensionsof al-Qaeda's activity hintatt he roots of the movementand at the rootcausesof Jihadist terrorism:the brutal suppression of Islamist opposition movements in the Arab world through authoritarianregimes.After first attempts totopple theseregimesin the 1970s,1980s,and 1990s failed, Islamist militants used the opportunity touniteand reorganizeabroad. Arab civil wars havelaid the foundation of globalJihadism. 
Arab civil wars have laid the foundation of globalJihadism The Internationalization of Jihadist Terrorismafter2001
Since2001the Islamo-nationalists havelost some of theirformerinfluence in the Jihadist movement.Thisispartlyduetothe factt hatt heyare confronted withareckless globalfightagainst terrorist organizationsled by the United States.Therefore,fighting the West hasgained importancef or thesem ovements and theirs upporters.Perhapsmost importantly,a lQaedahasbeen able tobroaden its basebys uccessfullyr ecruiting and increasing the numberof non-Arab Muslims in its ranks.Especiallyfrom 2003,ethnic Pakistanis,Kurds,and Turkshavejoined the movement,most of them in Europe. AlQaedahasprofited from the growing attractiveness of its globalaimsamong young Muslimsw orldwide. Likewise,severalIslamo-nationalist organizationshavej oined al-Qaeda. The most importantw ast he AlgerianSalafist Groupf orPreaching and Combat(Groupe Salafistepour laPrédication etle Combat,GSPC). Inlate January 2007,itannounced thatithadchanged its name to"al-Qaedain the IslamicMaghreb"(Qaidatal-JihadfiBiladal-Maghribal-Islami).
The GSPC hadbeen asmuchanationalist asanIslamist organization. Sincei ts founding in 1998,itexplicitlyconfined its activitiest oAlgeria, whereitaimed totopple the governmentand setupanIslamicstate. Bythe turnofthe century,the GSPC hadestablished itself asthe most important militantorganization in Algeria, but remained farfrom achieving its stated goals.While itmanaged togain limited support among Algerianmilitant Islamists,the population wasconvinced thatarmed struggle wasnota wayt obring about changesin Algeria.Asac onsequence,the GSPC was forced ontothe defensiveand the security forcess ucceeded in confining the group'soperationst oamountainous region east and southeast of Algiers.Larger-scale terrorist attackswereexceptions. 
SeveralIslamo-nationalist organizationshavejoined al-Qaeda
government'sassertions,whichsince2001h adtried toreframe its struggle against the country'smilitantgroupsaspart of the American "waron terrorism."
AsearlyasOctober2003,N abil Sahraoui,then the GSPC'sleader, announced thatt he organization hadsubordinated itself toOsamab in Laden'sal-Qaedaorganization and tothe Talibanl eaderMullahOmar, and would support theirfightagainst the US.Inthe coming years,itbuilt contacts toal-Qaeda, especiallyt othe JordanianAbuMusab al-Zarqawi and his"al-Qaedain Mesopotamia"(Qaidatal-JihadfiBiladal-Rafidain). 5 Sahraoui'ss uccessor,A buMusab Abdalwudud,c ontinued his predecessor'spolicy.InJune 2004,he confirmed the newinternational thrust of the GSPC bydeclaring waron all Westernforeigners in Algeria. InDecember2006,the groupcarried out its first attackonaforeign target in severalyears and in January 2007 joined al-Qaeda.
The GSPC'sinternationalization seemst oh avebeen the resultof its obvious problemsin keeping upi ts fightagainst the Algerianregime. Thesep roblemsw ereaccentuated byt he Iraqwar.From 2003,the organization hadtocope withthe increasing trend among young Algerianst otravel toIraqtof ightt he US rathert hantoj oin the fight against the Algeriang overnment.Itadopted ani nternationalist agenda partlytokeep thesepotentialrecruits in Algeria.However,the coincidence of the first stepst owardsinternationalization withthe intensification of Americanand Europeancounterterrorismcooperation ist oo obvious to ignore. Bygranting technologicaland logisticalsupport toAlgeria's security forces,the US governmentcontributed tothismove. The United Statesand its Europeanalliesbecame atargetforthe GSPC becausethey joined Algiers in its fightagainst the GSPC.Undert he circumstances,it wasonlylogicalf ort he GSPC toseek closercontactw ithanti-American terrorists in Iraqand Pakistan. Inf act,the GSPC'sleader,A buMusab Abdalwudud,confirmed thishypothesisin aninterviewwiththe NewYork Times in summer2008 (Droukdal,2008) . struggle against anauthoritarianregime. Bys upporting the Algerian regime,the United Statesand Europe could expects hort-termsecurity gains,namelyaweakening of the capabilitiesof the GSPC.Att he same time,however,theystrengthened thosewithin the GSPC leadership who demanded aninternationalization and therebycontributed tothe creation of the monstert hatt heyclaimed theyw eref ighting. Anylong-term counterterrorismstrategys hould focus on avoiding anauthoritarian consolidation in the Middle East and insteadm otivateregimesin the region toembarkonpoliticalreforms.
Towardsa"PoliticalTurn" in Countering Jihadist Terrorism
The fightagainst Jihadist terrorismwill bedecided in the Arab world. And if the West continuesits currentpoliciest owardst he region,itw ill perpetuatethe problem ratherthansolveit.Thisdoesnotnecessarilymean thatJihadist movements will win. Theyareweakand lackmass support. However,no matterhowstable regimesmaybetodayin countriessuchas Saudi Arabia, Egypt,and Algeria, if theydo notchange theywill collapse soonerorlater.Whethert he successfulrevolutionariesw ill beIslamists, nationalists,democrats,ors omething else,theyw ill opposethosewho formerlys upported theirdictators.Ifthe West continuest of ocus on security and stability,thesedictatorshipsarevery likelytoprovoke violent opposition forsome time tocome.
Onlyathorough reformo fp oliticalsystemsin the region will reduce internalconflicts and therebyopposition torepressiveregimes.Only governments thatintegratelargerparts of the population intothe decisionmaking process and offerv enuesin whichto express grievancesw ill bestable in the long run. Reformsmightnotend terrorist activities, but theyw ill reducewidespreadsympathies forthesemovements and will thereforereduce recruitmentopportunitiesand logisticalcapabilitiess uchthatt heyw ill eventuallyr endert errorist groupspoliticallyirrelevant.Thisist he dimension of the threaton whichthe internationalcommunity should focus its counterterrorismmeasures.
Suchashiftin Americanand Europeancounterterrorismp oliciesw ill requireac hange in paradigms:from security backtop olitics.While repressivem easuresaren ecessary in ordert of ightt errorists effectively, the farmorei mportantand difficultt askremainst owin overoratleast neutralizetheirs ympathizers.While the formerisashort-termtask,the latterisalong-termone.
Reformswill reduce widespreadsympathies forJihadist movements

WORLD POLICY CONFERENCE 2008
The Bushadministration wasawarethat9/11 hadi ts roots in Middle Easternauthoritarianismand thatt osolvethe problemst he regimesin the region hadtochange. Itespeciallys ingled out Saudi Arabiaa nd Egypt,its most powerfulArab allies,a nd American pressurel ed tosome efforts atr eformbetween 2003 and 2005. However,the Americanp romotion of ademocraticM iddle East remained half-hearted and metw ithresistancef rom the regimesin question. Most importantly,the naivei deathatt he invasion of Iraq mights erveasastarting pointdisqualified the projectfrom the beginning. From 2005,itbecame clearthatthe Americanshadfailed in Iraqand thattheyneeded the support of theirpro-Westernalliesin the region in ordert op reparef ort he futureconfrontation withIran. In 2006,W ashington hadg iven upo nd emocratization and insteadtried toconvinceits Arab alliesof the need tobuild ananti-Iranianalliance of "moderate" Arab states.Suddenly,the lessonsof 9/11 hadlost their formerimportance.
The newAmericanadministration ismorel ikelyt hanthe outgoing one tol isten tothe adviceo fi ts partners,no matterw hetherBarack ObamaorJohn McCain winst he election. But itw ill soon come under immensep ressuretoshowt angible results,a nd politicalm easuresare notv ery likelyt oh aveanys hort-terme ffect.Nevertheless,the first monthsof the newAmericang overnmentmightpresentt he internationalcommunity its onlychancetoi nfluencethe policiesof alQaeda'senemynumberone.
Europeann ationss hould shouldert hist ask. Here,especiallyin Brussels,therei sw idespreadawareness thatt he domesticsituationsin Middle Easterncountrieshaveani mpacton the developmentof Jihadist terrorismand thatinstability in the Arab world posesadirectt hreatt o Europe. However,in Europe foreign policyconcerning the region hasbeen stronglyinfluenced byt he aforementioned "security paradigm." Counterterrorismcooperation between the respectivesecurity forces comesfirst,politicalreformsecond,if atall.
Arab statesthemselvesflatlydenythatauthoritarianismisarootcause of Jihadist terrorism. Theypointinsteadtothe Israeli-Palestinianconflict and Westernf oreign policyon the region in ordert oavoid addressing questionsabout theirownd omesticpolicies.Oncethe US gaveupi ts democratization drivein2005and 2006,the Arab statesconsolidated their positions.Most importantly,the oil and gasexporters among them have profited from high energyprices,whichhavestrengthened theirposition withregardtothe US and Europe. Therefore,anydriveforpoliticalreforminthe Arab world isunlikelyto havei mmediateand importantr esults.Nevertheless,reformi su rgent becauseJihadist terrorismhasshownremarkable resilienceand islikelyto poseathreatforanumberof years.Asuitable strategycould beo ne in whichthe United Statesexerted pressureonits alliestopersuade them to liberalizetheirpoliticalsystemsand allowformorepoliticalparticipation, while the Europeansoffered enhanced cooperation. Bothwould haveto intensifytheirefforts toconvincetheseregimesthatlimited reform,most importantlyregarding the rule of law,mightin the long runstabilizetheir states.Even small progress could make adifference,foritw ould restore tothe West some of the credibility withArabsand Muslimsithaslost since9/11.
